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Summary 
This paper studies long term performance of cross-border M&As of Japanese firms in the period between 
2008 and 2015 through a study of their cumulative abnormal return and buy-and-hold abnormal return. 
It also studies the effects of certain parameters like cash richness, book-to-market ratio, relative cost of 
the deal and the cultural difference between the two firms involved in the long term performance of M&As. 
The results show that overall long term CAR is significantly positive at 7.3%, although this is not backed 
up by the BHAR, which is positive but not statistically significant. The BTM ratio, relative cost of the deal 
and culture variables also show a significant impact. 
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Chapter 1. Introduction 
International mergers and acquisitions have been a contentious topic in Japan as of late. In light 
of some recent spectacular failures by established companies like Toshiba1 or Japan Post2, some experts 
are starting to consider whether there is an elevated difficulty for Japanese companies when it comes to 
extracting profitability out of their cross border acquisitions. One editorial found in Japan Times stated 
that “M&A experts say the key to averting management friction with a foreign unit is to engage in constant 
communication with managers in broad layers at the acquired firm. But few Japanese companies are said 
to be successful in doing that due to language barriers. As a result, it is believed that only 30-40 percent 
of the overseas acquisitions by Japanese firms in the past decade have successfully produced the intended 
synergy effects over the long term.3” When looking at possible characteristics of Japanese companies that 
might be a handicap when dealing with foreign firms, the issue of culture comes to mind. Present-day 
Japanese corporate culture has deep roots in the country’s history and development of private institutions, 
especially during the Meiji Restoration and the rise of the zaibatsu. This genuine character differentiates 
Japanese corporations from any others around the globe, and these different cultures might be problematic 
when trying to merge them.  
This paper investigates the long-term stock performance of Japanese firms that acquire foreign 
companies after 2008. Since we are focusing on cultural difference, which is something that takes more 
than a few days to manifest, we will be looking at these events from the announcement date up until the 
                                                        
1 White, Edward & Crooks, Ed; “Toshiba closes at 2-month high after offloading Westinghouse”, Financial 
Times, January 5th 2018, (https://www.ft.com/content/e13760d8-6a05-31ee-9234-1a0f0264a2a5) 
2 Lewis, Leo; “Japan Post considers multibillion-dollar Toll Group write-down”, Financial Times, April 21st 
2017, (https://www.ft.com/content/585e074a-264d-11e7-8691-d5f7e0cd0a16)  
3 Japan Times Editorial; “Learning from overseas M&A cases that went wrong”, Japan Times, August 10th 
2017, (https://www.japantimes.co.jp/opinion/2017/08/20/editorials/learning-overseas-ma-cases-went-
wrong/#.WzXBNBIzY1J)  
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next 500 days after that. We will perform a long-term event study to analyze the wealth effect from the 
point of view of the Japanese bidder.  
We will relate the results from the event studies with other factors that have been proven in past 
research as having an impact on M&A performance, more specifically the cash a company has available 
at the time of the announcement, that is to say their budget constraint in the decision-making process, and 
the confidence of the company’s management, estimated by the BTM ratio; separating companies into 
what Rau and Vermaelen (1998) called “glamour” and “value” firms. The analysis will also be 
complemented by the introduction of a relative cost variable that will measure how big the deal was in 
terms of the absolute cost of the transaction compared with the market value of the bidder. This deeper 
analysis will help us better understand the decision-making behind the management of M&As by the 
bidder company in different scenarios.  
Furthermore, we will introduce culture into the equation to see if Japanese companies can extract 
more profit from companies that are culturally more similar to them or if, on the contrary, it’s the difference 
in culture that helps them achieve a better abnormal return on the long run. This analysis will use 
Hofstede’s cultural dimensions as a quantifiable measure of the difference between the target company’s 
culture and the Japanese.  
Since our methodology is a long-term event study leading up to the traditional construction of the 
cumulative abnormal return (CAR) for that period, it could result in a possible bias as Barber and Lyon 
(1997) have discussed, so we will also conduct a BHAR study as a robust check for the results we find 
using CAR. Additionally, we will look at short term CAR to try to come up with additional insight on the 
overall behavior of Japanese companies in the M&A process.  
The rest of the dissertation is structured as follows: In section 2 I will reference the relevant 
literature I used as a basis for this study. Section 3 will be a short introduction to the history of M&As in 
Japan, which will be useful to identify the period of this study and its place in the overall history of foreign 
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company acquisitions in Japan. Section 4 will list the hypothesis that will be tested in this dissertation. 
Section 5 will take note of the different sources of data, the treatment they have incurred and the 
methodology used to reach the results. Section 6 will report the results of each relevant analysis and 
explain the conclusions that can be extracted from them as well as referencing back to the literature in 
section 2 and how the results compare to their findings. Finally, section 7 will conclude the paper with 
some final thoughts on the result as well as pointing to further research that could be done in this field.  
Chapter 2. Literature 
Section 1. General literature on event studies and abnormal return 
The topic of M&A gains has been widely studied in past literature from many aspects. The general 
findings point to three conclusions (Loughran & Vijh, 1997). First, the target shareholders’ abnormal 
return after the acquisition is significantly positive (Asquith, 1983; Bradley, Desai, & Kim, 1988; Dodd, 
1980; Dodd & Ruback, 1977); second, the acquiring shareholders’ abnormal returns after a tender 
acquisition are low or not significant (M. C. Jensen & Ruback, 1983; Kummer & Hoffmeister, 1978); and 
third,  acquiring shareholders’ abnormal returns after a merger are negative (Malatesta, 1983). 
All of these conclusions, however, were reached by studying M&As in the United States. 
Regarding the particulars of Japanese M&As, one of the first major studies came from Pettway and 
Yamada (1986). They concluded that, similar to the US case, the wealth of acquiring firms increases after 
an M&A, but not in a statistically significant way. This study was carried out at a time, the 1980s, of high 
economic growth in Japan. Following that decade, however, the Japanese economy crashed and began a 
period of sluggish recovery. With that came new government incentives for companies to pursue new 
ways of being profitable, including measures to incentivize M&A deals4. Higgins and Beckman (2006) 
studied the effects of these measures and the overall state of the Japanese M&As after the 1990’s crash. 
                                                        
4 Explained further in section 3.  
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The interest in Higgins and Beckman’s paper comes from its study of domestic versus cross border deals 
that directly concerns this paper. The general conclusion of Higgins and Beckman is that bidders in 
domestic M&As enjoy a positive CAR after the introduction of the new legislation, even more if they 
participate in a domestic bidding. In this regard, the paper is consistent with the findings of Denis, Denis, 
& Yost (2016) which claimed that an increase in global diversification causes a loss of value for 
corporations. The research of Kester (1991) and (1997) documents how Japanese acquisitions have been 
motivated by strategic alliances, like the acquisition of a new product or the protection from a competitor, 
rather than financial considerations, which has resulted in disastrous international deals with huge under-
performance issues for acquiring firms.  
When it comes to long term event studies like the one in this particular paper, Rau and Vermaelen  
(1998) differentiate between merger bidders and tender bidders to conclude that the former underperform 
after a 3 year window and the latter have a small but statistically significant abnormal return. Their results 
are contested by previous researches however. Langetieg (1978) found, for the same window of 3 years 
after the event, that any positive abnormal returns that might result from a merger were not significant. 
Harris, Franks and Titman (1991) also reached inconclusive results, with some evidence pointing to 
negative returns, depending on the benchmark they used. More conclusive evidence was found by Agrawal, 
Jaffe and Mandelkar (1992) to point to the direction of negative abnormal returns for acquiring firms over 
the 5 years port-merger period. 
Section 2. Beyond the general abnormal return 
Researchers have always wanted to go a step further when analyzing why M&A investments are 
made the way they are made. Around the 80s the idea of overconfident firms or managers pulling through 
investments that turn out to be disasters started to take shape. Researchers like Roll (1986) theorized that 
the more successful a company is, the more trust it places on its managerial team, which feels less 
restrained and more willing to undertake investments in a less prudent way than before, he named it the 
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“hubris hypothesis”. This, he said, brings to a loss in profitability which contrasts with firms with more 
budget constraints. To investigate this, researchers have used two general indicators: the cash available to 
make further investments, generally reflected in the company’s budget, and the success of the firm 
compared to the rest of the market, reflected in the market price relative to the book size.  
When it comes to the behavior of cash-rich firms in M&As, the general literature points to value 
destruction when companies decide to invest their excess cash into M&As. Harford (1999) uses balance 
sheet indicators, such as Cash/Sales or Cash/Total Assets, to identify cash-rich firms. His conclusions 
point out that not only are all cash-rich firms more prone to carrying out M&As, but that variables 
explaining the likelihood of cash-rich firms experiencing agency problems (such as firms with low 
managerial stock ownership) have a significant effect on the amount of acquisitions undertaken. These 
cash-rich firms are also more likely to enter value-decreasing deals considering their short-term stock price 
behavior and their long-term performance post-event. 
For the relationship between the book-to-market ratio and post-acquisition performance we go 
back to Rau and Vermaelen’s (1998) paper. They considered low book-to-market companies as “glamour” 
firms and use the hubris hypothesis coined by Roll (1986) to explain how their M&A investments decrease 
the value of the bidding firm. Their management team, after a long history of growth and high returns, are 
more likely to overpay for a target because they feel they can do no wrong and investors give them a lot 
of leeway. This is reversed for high book-to-market companies, which are more prudent before 
undertaking an acquisition. The results show that, although in the short term the market is more confident 
in the “glamour” firms’ success, which experience a higher stock price increase, the situation reverses in 
the long term, and they tend to underperform. On the other hand, Lang, Stulz and Walkling (1991) and 
Servaes (1991) both used Tobin’s q as a measure of a firm’s overvalued-ness in the market and found 
similar results that point to this direction. 
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Loderer and Martin (1990) did an extensive study on the effects of different variables on M&A 
announcements. Their general conclusion was that the benefit from acquiring established firms was 
dubious, but one result of particular interest to this paper is the one referring to the effect of the relative 
and absolute value of the deal on the announcement reactions. According to Loderer and Martin, 
companies undertaking large bids were more prone to overpricing their acquisitions and, therefore, to enter 
value-decreasing acquisitions.  
Regarding how culture affects the economy and its many parts, many researchers have argued 
that major cultural differences between nations have an effect on economic and institutional relationships 
(Brockner, 2003; Chen, Mannix, & Okumura, 2003; Earley & Singh, 1995; Kristjánsdóttir, Guðlaugsson, 
Guðmundsdóttir, & Aðalsteinsson, 2017).  
Chapter 3. History of M&As in Japan 
Japanese companies’ relationship with mergers and acquisitions has gone through three distinct 
phases since 1983 (June & Lomer, 2017), when the first recorded M&A operation occurred, as Japan’s 
domestic economy has demanded different sources or profitability. It is important that we take a look at 
these phases to pinpoint the time period that will be examined in this paper. Figure 1 provides key data in 
understanding these phases. 
Phase 1 (1983-1998): This period is characterized by a strong Japanese economy in terms of 
growth. This, coupled with the fact that Japanese corporate strategy focused on other fields and was not 
yet as comfortable with acquisitions as western companies were, resulted in an experimental phase with 
very little events.  
The period between 1989 and 1990 was a transition period in which Japanese companies, riding 
the financial bubble, had so much excess cash that they began acquiring foreign assets. 
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Figure 1 – Source Dealogic and Thomson One, as of March 31, 2017 
Phase 2 (1999-2008): The post bubble period is characterized mainly by the consolidation of 
domestic financial institutions guided by government efforts to incentivize a slugging economy. The 
Japanese automotive industry, following global trends, also began its consolidation. As mentioned before, 
the packet of government actions and new legislation that came into effect after the bubble burst was 
effective in incentivizing M&As and their CAR (Higgins & Beckman, 2006). 
Phase 3 (2008-Present): After a long period of suffering a stagnant economy and the outlook of a 
population decline in the horizon, Japanese companies began to look outside for growth opportunities, in 
search of new markets and intellectual properties. This phase has seen cross border deals increase 
significantly, going over 50% of the overall value in 2012 and reaching new heights in 2017. The reason 
for this is the relatively small impact the global financial crisis of 2008 had on the investment power of 
Japanese companies compared with the rest of the world, which resulted in many struggling European and 
American firms being easy targets for Japanese companies (Suzuki, 2017).  
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This paper will therefore, study the M&A transactions that occurred since the beginning of the 
period in 2008 and continued all the way up to the present. Of course, this being a long-term study, the 
newest transactions with enough data available for study are the ones conducted before the end of 2015. 
Chapter 4. Hypotheses 
There are five hypotheses that this thesis will put to the test: 
H1. Japanese companies that carried out a cross border M&A transaction between January 2008 
and December 2015 have zero abnormal returns in the period between the day of the event and 500 days 
later.  
H2. If there are abnormal returns, companies that have more cash available to make this decision 
will end up choosing a less profitable investment than companies with a tighter budget constraint. 
H3. If there are abnormal returns, companies whose management enjoys more confidence, shown 
in the company’s book-to-market ratio, will end up choosing a less profitable investment than companies 
that are more cautious.  
H4. If there are abnormal returns, companies that enter relatively expensive deals will be hurt by 
the over-pricing of their targets by negative abnormal returns. 
H5. If there are abnormal returns, target companies that have cultural dimensions closer to their 
Japanese acquirer will achieve better synergy and this will have a positive impact in the abnormal returns. 
Chapter 5. Data & Methodology 
Section 1. Mergers & Acquisitions 
As the basic database I used the Recof Mergers and Acquisitions Database. From the initial 
database I filtered the deals that were cross border and limited the transactions to more than ¥5M. This 
resulted in 4615 observations. Following that I eliminated the transactions in which no Japanese 
companies were involved, leaving me with 4497 total observations. I proceeded to filter the observations 
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to only the ones that had the variable data classification (“Data-Shubetsu”) set to M&A and the 
announcement date set between January 1st 2008 and December 31st 2015. The matching observations 
were 1826. After that I eliminated any countries from the list for which I did not have sufficient data, 
leaving me with 1410 observations. I also eliminated any observations for which the acquiring firm was 
not listed and limited the variable action (“keitai”) to only takeovers and mergers. 542 observations were 
left after that. Lastly, after carrying out the analysis, I discarded investment funds and companies that 
carried out more than one transaction in a short period of time since that would disrupt the market model. 
I also had to discard particular firms for which I did not have enough data. In this phase of the analysis I 
decided to focus only on events in which Japanese companies were the bidding firm and had to discard 
the additional study I had planned for events in which Japanese companies were targets since there were 
only a few events left of this kind for analysis. The final number of observations was 183.   
Section 2. Abnormal returns 
For estimating the abnormal returns, I used Cumulative Abnormal Returns (CAR) and then 
checked the robustness of the results with a Buy-and-Hold Abnormal Returns (BHAR) analysis. 
Section 2.1. Cumulative Abnormal Returns (CAR) 
For the calculation of CAR, I created a market model to figure out the daily normal returns of 
each company in the 500 days after the event. To do that I used the 3 factor model proposed by Fama and 
French (Fama & French, 1993; French, 1992).  
!𝑅# − 𝑅%& = 𝛽)*+#!𝑅+,- − 𝑅%& + 𝛽/)0#𝑆𝑀𝐵 + 𝛽4)5#𝐻𝑀𝐿 
In which Ri is the daily return of company i with net dividends, which I got from Bloomberg’s 
database. Rf is the daily risk-free rate of the country that company i belongs to, which I got from Kenneth 
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French’s website5. RTPX is the daily return of the TOPIX (Tokyo Price Index) index, used here as the proxy 
for the market return.  
SMB, which stands for Small Minus Big, and HML, which stands for High Minus Low, are the 
variables introduced by Fama French that measure the historic excess return that small capitalization 
companies won over big caps (SMB) and value stocks over growth stocks (HML). I also got this data from 
French’s website.  
By regressing the daily returns of each company during the testing period you are able to get the 
three betas that form the market model. In this paper I used the period that goes from 200 days before the 
event to 50 days before the event. I used a rather long period because the post-acquisition period I want to 
analyze is also long term. The resulting coefficients were checked for their significance, if they were not 
statistically different from 0 with a confidence interval of 5% or less they were just substituted for 0.  
It is worth to take a moment here to talk about the intercept or alpha. After an initial analysis in 
which the intercept was not set to 0, I found that only 9 out of the 307 companies for which I did this 
study6 had a significant value of it. This created a risk of overestimating the normal return of these 9 
companies, since I would be applying this model over the 500 days following the event, multiplying this 
intercept over a long period. This led me to the conclusion that it would be better to set the intercept at 0, 
since it is not overall significant for the rest of the companies. 
After getting the results for the significant coefficients of the market model of each individual 
company, I applied them to the 500 days following the event to get the daily normal returns and subtracted 
that to the actual daily returns to get the daily abnormal returns. I added them up to get the final Cumulative 
Abnormal Return for each company and checked for significance.  
                                                        
5 http://mba.tuck.dartmouth.edu/pages/faculty/ken.french/data_library.html 
6 I later dropped the number of companies even further to reach the final number mentioned earlier. 
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Section 2.2. Buy-and-Hold Abnormal Returns (BHAR) 
The calculation of BHAR is much simpler than the CAR calculation although it has no checks for 
significance along the way. The basic formula is as follows: 
𝐵𝐻𝐴𝑅 = 𝑃#:;<< − 𝑃#:<𝑃#:< − 𝑃+,-:;<< − 𝑃+,-:<𝑃+,-:<  
In which 𝑃#:= is the stock price of company i at time x and 𝑃+,-:= is the price of the TOPIX index 
at time x. I used Bloomberg’s database to get the individual company’s stock price as well as the TOPIX 
price for each period.  
Barber and Lyon (1997) argue that it is better to use another individual stock of a company similar 
to the one that is being studied instead of the market index, but this would require resources that escape 
the scope of this research since there are 183 individual events to be studied. Therefore I believe that the 
best single index to use with all of the studied companies is the TOPIX index.  
Section 3. Wilcoxon Signed Ranks Test for Median 
For every step of the analysis I will be conducting the Wilcoxon signed ranks test for the median 
of each group of events and reporting it when the result is statistically significant up to a 10% confidence 
level. The Wilcoxon signed ranks test computes the absolute difference between each observation and the 
mean and then ranks them from high to low. The basic hypothesis of this test states that the sum of the 
ranks for the samples above and below the median should be similar. Rejecting the hypothesis means that 
the median is not equal to the preset value, which in this particular case will always be set to 0. I will use 
the results of this test to either strengthen the results given by the analysis of the mean or to question 
contradicting results. 
Section 4. Culture Difference 
The concept of culture is very abstract and hard to quantify. After observing the most common 
ways of quantifying culture in economic studies I decided to use the system developed by Hofstede (1980) 
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based on four cultural dimensions which he later expanded to six7. These dimensions were coined by 
Hofstede as a shortcut to describing the culture present in a particular nation and help it better communicate 
with others by knowing where each of them stood in the six different parameters. What follows is a 
description of each of the dimensions: 
Power Distance Index (PDI): A high PDI is that of a society which accepts and unequal, 
hierarchical distribution of power; China, for example, shows a high value in this dimension (80 out of a 
100). On the contrary, low PDI scores show that a society does not tolerate situations in which there’s an 
unequal distribution of power, as it is normally very dispersed and shared between many participants. 
Germany and Great Britain are a great example of this, with a score of 35 out of 100.  
Individualism Versus Collectivism (IDV): A high IDV score denotes an individualistic society, 
characterized by a low shared responsibility for the actions and outcomes of other members of a group. 
USA is the paramount example of this with a score of 91 out of 100. On the other hand, collectivist 
societies, which show low IDV scores, like South Korea or Taipei, with 18 and 17 out of 100 respectively, 
expect their members to be loyal to their groups, for which they share a great amount of responsibility 
with other members.  
Masculinity Versus Femininity (MAS): This variable reflects the distinction between the roles 
played by men and women in a society. Societies with high MAS scores, for which Japan would be an 
example (95 out of 100), have a smaller overlap between the roles of men and women. Values traditionally 
associated with men, such as being assertive and strong are highly valued. Societies with low MAS scores 
like France (43 out of 100) place a greater weight to what has typically been associated with feminine 
attitudes, such as sensitivity and cooperation. Female and male roles also show a higher degree of overlap.  
                                                        
7 Source: Geert Hofstede’s official website:  https://geerthofstede.com/culture-geert-hofstede-gert-jan-
hofstede/6d-model-of-national-culture/ 
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Uncertainty Avoidance Index (UAI): Societies where its members value predictability and control, 
like Japan (92 out of 100), have high UAI scores and tend to be risk averse. On the other hand, we have 
countries like Singapore with a score of 8 out of 100, which tend to be more open, inclusive or risk takers.  
Pragmatic Versus Normative (PRA): High PRA values belong to societies like Japan (88), South 
Korea (93) or Taiwan (100). They are, as the name suggest, more pragmatic, modest and long term oriented 
than countries like the USA (26), that tend to be more religious and nationalistic. This variable is related 
with to what set of rules or moral code the members of a particular society place their faith into.  
Indulgence Versus Restraint (IVR): This variable is high in cultures in which indulging in the 
gratification of one’s own desires is encouraged, like Australia, which has a score of 71 out of 100. On the 
opposite side of the spectrum you have cultures like the one in Hong Kong (17 out of 100) or in India (26 
out of 100) that value the suppression of one’s own desires in favor of stricter social norms.   
After considering each dimension, I arrived at the conclusion that only using PDI, IDV and UAI 
to conduct my study would be the best choice. These three variables are the most related to business 
performance, especially in M&As. Power difference can influence the way the relationship between 
acquirer and target is viewed by both parties, creating issues like the distribution of power or the authority 
of decision-making. Following this thought I created two groups of companies based on the PDI index 
associated with them: horizontal and vertical. This labels refer to the hierarchy inside the company that 
comes from the perceived power distance between layers of corporate authority. Horizontal companies 
have a flat hierarchy in which power is more relative to the situation and needs of the firm and vertical 
firm have a more clear power distribution and a higher hierarchical pyramid.  
Individualism affects relations between coworkers and the way decisions are made inside the 
company. Following the PDI differentiation mentioned above, I also categorized the target companies 
based as either individualistic and collectivist. Uncertainty avoidance speaks more of the way each 
company is managed and the expectations and risks associated with management. I created three groups 
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for this variable following the example set by a previous research by Bremer, Hoshi, Inoue and Suzuki 
(2017). On the other hand, MAS, PRA and IVR seem to affect personal relations and behaviors outside of 
the working environment, which falls outside of the scope of this research.  
Section 5. Other Variables 
Section 5.1. Cash Ratio 
I used Bloomberg’s data to figure out the level of cash relative to a company’s revenue at the time 
of the announcement. 
𝐶𝑎𝑠ℎ	𝑅𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑜 = 𝑇𝑜𝑡𝑎𝑙	𝐶𝑎𝑠ℎ𝑅𝑒𝑣𝑒𝑛𝑢𝑒  
Section 5.2. Relative Cost Variable 
To find out the relative cost of the deal I used the bidders market value and the absolute value of 
the transaction. This was due to the difficulty in finding reliable information on the targets beyond the 
ones provided by Recof since the great majority of them were not listed at the time of the announcement. 
𝑅𝑒𝑙𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑣𝑒	𝐶𝑜𝑠𝑡 = 𝐴𝑏𝑠𝑜𝑙𝑢𝑡𝑒	𝑐𝑜𝑠𝑡	𝑜𝑓	𝑡ℎ𝑒	𝑑𝑒𝑎𝑙𝑀𝑎𝑟𝑘𝑒𝑡	𝑐𝑎𝑝𝑖𝑡𝑎𝑙𝑖𝑧𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛	𝑜𝑓	𝑡ℎ𝑒	𝑏𝑖𝑑𝑑𝑒𝑟	𝑎𝑡	𝑡ℎ𝑒	𝑡𝑖𝑚𝑒	𝑜𝑓	𝑡ℎ𝑒	𝑑𝑒𝑎𝑙 
I divided the events between cheap and expensive setting the threshold at 20%. The reason behind 
this is that the Article 784-3-(3) 8 of the Japanese Companies Act allows a simplified approach to mergers 
when the target is 20% or below of the book value of the acquirer. In this specific case I decided to use 
                                                        
8 Article 784-3-(3) of Companies Act: “(3) The provisions of the preceding Article and the preceding 
paragraph shall not apply in cases where the sum of the book value of the assets that the Succeeding Company 
in Absorption-type Company Split succeeds to through the Absorption-type Company Split does not exceed 
one-fifth (or, in cases where a lesser proportion is prescribed in the articles of incorporation of the Splitting 
Stock Company in Absorption-type Company Split, such proportion) of the amount calculated by the method 
specified by the applicable Ordinance of the Ministry of Justice as the total assets of the Splitting Stock 
Company in Absorption-type Company Split.”  
http://www.japaneselawtranslation.go.jp/law/detail/?vm=04&re=01&id=2052 
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the market value instead of the book value because it allowed for more transactions to fall on the 
“expensive” side, giving significance to the results.  
Chapter 6. Results 
Section 1. Long term abnormal returns in cross-border acquisitions by Japanese 
companies (H1)  
Table 1. Comparison of Japanese bidders in M&As’ long-term (500 days) abnormal return 
calculation through CAR and BHAR methodologies 
Overall Abnormal Returns 
 CAR BHAR 
Mean 0.07381774** 0.04823917 
Standard Error 0.03458523 0.04609783 
t-stat 2.13437194 1.04645192 
Median1 0.066699368** 0.0000000 
Count 183 183 
Minimum -1.4864194 -1.654313 
Maximum 1.630014 2.45104134 
** Statistical significance at 5% level of confidence 
 
The first conclusion we can draw from this analysis is that the average abnormal return 500 days 
after the acquisition is significantly positive if we take into account the CAR. The BHAR is not statistically 
significant, but it does not contradict the result of the CAR. The Wilcoxon signed ranks test also supports 
the rejection of the CAR=0 hypothesis. Table 2 supports this when it finds no difference between the 
means of CAR and BHAR.  
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Table 2. Test for difference of means of CAR and BHAR 
z-Test: Two Sample for Means   
  CAR BHAR 
Mean 0.07381774 0.04823917 
Known Variance 0.21889327 0.38887688 
Observations 183 183 
Hypothesized Mean Difference 0  
z 0.44384594  
P(Z<=z) two-tail 0.65715397   
 
Due to the fact that we can’t draw statistically significant conclusions from the BHAR, further 
analysis in this paper will be done using only the CAR. The CAR shows that we can reject H1, that 
Japanese companies partaking in cross border acquisitions from 2008 to 2015 have no significant long-
term abnormal returns. This 7.3% positive CAR is similar to the 9% long term return for tender offers 
observed by Rau and Vermaelen (1998) without previous classifications. It also doesn’t contradict the 
majority of the researches that point out that the loss of value undertaken by bidders in M&As is a myth, 
specially the results obtained by other papers both in the US (M. C. Jensen & Ruback, 1983; Kummer & 
Hoffmeister, 1978) and in Japan (Pettway & Yamada, 1986) and also coincides with other long-term M&A 
analysis (Harris et al., 1991; Langetieg, 1978). This myth is probably prolonged by the great headlines 
that spectacular failures of big international M&As have occupied in the past while long term profitable 
and sustainable successes have had no such impact.  
Section 2. Short term abnormal returns in cross-border acquisitions by Japanese 
companies 
Following the long term analysis of international M&As, I decided to carry out a short term 
analysis which covered the period from one day prior to the event to 5 days afterwards to strengthen my 
thesis and try to draw a clearer picture.  
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Table 3. Short-term (5 days) abnormal returns (CAR) of Japanese bidders in cross-border M&As. 
Short Term Abnormal Returns 
 CAR 
Mean 0.84345101 
Standard Error 0.521959901 
t-stat 1.615930665 
Median 0.000000000 
Count 183 
Minimum -19.30013352 
Maximum 61.1572 
 
As can be observed in Table 3, the short-term returns of cross border M&As by Japanese 
companies are not statistically significant from 0. This result goes in line with the general understanding 
of previous researches (Loughran & Vijh, 1997), more specifically Jensen and Ruback (1983) and 
Kummer and Hoffmeister (1978). Since short-term returns are based on market reactions and they are 
much more sensitive to expectations, this result points to the fact that there is a lukewarm feeling towards 
international M&As in Japan strengthened by the myth that they tend to fail. This contrasts heavily with 
the positive long term CAR results, much more based on the company’s actual performance than market 
expectations.  
Section 3. Cash-richness on Abnormal Returns (H2) 
As mentioned before, we want to test the hypothesis advanced by Jensen (M. Jensen, 1986) that 
companies with a lot of cash to spend tend to spend it in a less profitable way than companies with a tighter 
budget. The process of this study will be to divide the companies in quartiles based on their level of cash 
relative to their revenue and check for differences in the profitability of their cross-border M&A 
investments. In this case, Q1 refers to the companies with the least level of cash compared to their revenue 
and Q4 refers to the companies in which this ratio is the highest. 
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Table 4. CAR cross-section descriptive analysis across different levels of cash/revenue of the 
Japanese bidder at the time of the announcement of the M&A. 
Abnormal Returns by Cash/Revenue Quartile 
 Q1 Q2 Q3 Q4 
Mean 0.09588881 0.08084997 0.12123514 0.00615757 
Standard Error 0.06256376 0.0720468 0.08202726 0.06328453 
t-stat 1.53265726 1.12218675 1.47798602 0.0972997 
Median 0.003653 0.079491 0.117858*** 0.007674 
Count 45 45 45 45 
Minimum CAR -0.4293823 -1.4864194 -1.2563497 -1.4591699 
Maximum CAR 1.25224322 1.630014 1.26119413 0.78039056 
Minimum Cash/Rev. 0.0325 0.3035 0.4809 0.8842 
Maximum Cash/Rev. 0.3031 0.4771 0.8816 11.0455 
*** Statistical significance at 1% confidence level 
 
Table 4 shows that none of the quartiles have a statistically significant average return, which leads 
us to the conclusion that cash-richness, or in this case the level of cash relative to each company’s revenue, 
does not have an effect on the long term returns of international M&As of Japanese companies. The 
Wilcoxon signed ranks test does attribute a statistical significant median return to Q3 companies, which 
are the ones with the highest mean and median returns, this could point us to the conclusion that companies 
with a medium-upper level of cash/revenue perform better than the ones with the highest level of 
cash/revenue. 
Although the difference in the means of Q1 and Q4 companies seems substantial in Table 4, the 
mean of Q3 companies breaks the trend and a further analysis into the mean differences, shown in Table 
5, demonstrates how the two means are not statistically significantly different.  
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Table 5. Test for difference of means of between Q1 (lowest cash/revenue) and Q4 (highest 
cash/revenue) Japanese bidders’ CAR in cross-border M&As. 
z-Test: Two Sample for Means   
  Q1 Q4 
Mean 0.09588881 0.00615757 
Known Variance 0.17614011 0.18022193 
Observations 45 45 
Hypothesized Mean Difference 0  
z 1.00833355  
P(Z<=z) two-tail 0.31329436   
 
We can, therefore, not confirm H2, as we can’t say with enough proof that the cash levels of the 
bidders at the time of the announcement affects the long-term profitability of the M&A. If anything, the 
median analysis seems to point to a non-linear relationship between CAR and Cash/revenue, although this 
is not supported by the mean analysis and the low number of observations per quartile makes the Wilcoxon 
test, which relies on the Central Limit Theorem, less reliable.  
Section 4. Book-to-Market on Abnormal Returns (H3) 
Following Rau and Vermaelen (1998) hypothesis of “glamour” firms, we’ll divide the companies 
in the sample in two groups depending on their book-to-market (BTM) ratio. Companies with a high BTM 
Ratio will be considered value firms, since their price in the market is backed up by the actual value of the 
equity in the company’s books. Companies with a low BTM owe much of their market price to 
expectations, or “glamour” as Rau and Vermaelen say, therefore its price differs further from the actual 
book value. 
  
 23 
Table 6. CAR cross-section descriptive analysis across Value (high BTM) and Glamour (low BTM) 
Japanese bidder companies at the time of the announcement of the M&A. 
Abnormal Returns by BTM 
 Value Glamour 
Mean 0.0579015 0.09416424* 
Standard Error 0.04904204 0.05032505 
Median 0.11818813* 0.00450754 
t-stat 1.18065025 1.87112043 
Count 90 90 
Minimum -1.4864194 -1.1333244 
Maximum 1.25224322 1.630014 
* Statistical significance at 10% level of confidence 
Contradicting Rau and Vermaelen (1998) and our own H3, we find that when Japanese companies 
decide to purchase foreign companies, it’s the ones that have a lower BTM, therefore the “glamour firms”, 
that have statistically significant positive abnormal results in the long term. Significant at a 10%, 
companies with low BTM have a 9.4% cumulative abnormal return after an acquisition, contrasting the 
non-significant CAR of “value” firms. In this case, however, the Wilcoxon signed ranks test points to 
value firms being the ones with positive CAR, which weakens the overall conclusion of this section. These 
results are also weakened by the fact that the z-test for two sample means in Table 7 shows that there is 
no significant difference in the mean CAR of both categories. This should not, however, impede us to 
extract some conclusions from the initial results.  
Table 7. Test for difference of means between Value and Glamour Japanese bidders’ CAR in 
cross-border M&As. 
z-Test: Two Sample for Means (Value vs Glamour) 
  Value Glamour 
Mean 0.0579015 0.09416424 
Known Variance 0.216461 0.227935 
Observations 90 90 
Hypothesized Mean Difference 0  
z -0.5160559  
P(Z<=z) two-tail 0.60581537   
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It’s important to consider the setting here to draw a clearer analysis, since we are studying a very 
particular type of M&A transaction. The fact that we are talking about international acquisitions in the 
Japanese context, together with these results makes me think that the interpretation of high and low BTM 
companies that Rau and Vermaelen did might not apply here. Instead of looking at low BTM companies 
as these overconfident firms that are waiting for a bad decision to bring them back down to earth, we 
should be looking at them as the new wave of promising Japanese companies that are willing to try new 
strategies to grow in this new setting. We have already discussed how more traditional Japanese companies 
struggled after the economic crisis of the 90s to find new ways of growth and that even the government 
had to get involved and incentivize certain strategies that older firms were too scared to try, M&As being 
one of them. In Bremer et al. (2017) mentioned earlier in which they studied how risk avoidance affected 
M&As in the period between 2000 and 2009, we can see how the majority of Japanese firms are still, at 
this period, reticent to commit to cross border M&As and when they do, they tend to overpay and 
mismanage them, getting non-positive returns as a result. These older firms have been in the market longer 
and, thus, they have a more stabilized market value that resembles more closely their book value, which 
means these are the companies that make up the “value” firms category in these analysis and, thus the ones 
that are not getting positive returns out of their M&As. In contrast, companies who were born in this 
contemporary globalized society are more willing to undertake international ventures and have a global 
mindset that allows them to understand cultural differences better. These companies, who have high 
expectations placed upon them and, thus, a lower BTM ratio, are the ones able to break out of the fear and 
uncertainty that clouds older companies and commit to riskier and more profitable cross border M&As. 
That’s the reason we are seeing these results, and further studies in the culture section of these paper will 
further prove my point of view.  
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Section 5. Relative Cost on Abnormal Returns (H4) 
Table 8. CAR cross-section descriptive analysis across Cheap (low Relative Cost) and Expensive 
(high Relative Cost) M&A transactions by Japanese bidder companies 
Abnormal Returns by Relative Cost 
 Cheap Expensive 
Mean 0.07306576** 0.08990948 
Standard Error 0.03593587 0.09609446 
t-stat 2.03322632 0.9356365 
Median 0.07559147** 0.05253346 
Count 144 38 
Minimum CAR -1.4591699 -1.4864194 
Maximum CAR 1.26119413 1.630014 
Minimum Rel. Cost 0.00026756 0.20020282 
Maximum Rel. Cost 0.19530517 1.34360536 
** Statistical significance at 5% confidence level. 
 
The results point to a link between cheap acquisitions and positive long-term returns, while 
expensive bids don’t show a significant benefit. Both mean and median CAR analysis support this 
assumption. This result follows our initial hypothesis (H4) and the conclusions of Loderer and Martin 
(1990) on this topic. The results suggest that Japanese companies undertaking expensive cross-border 
acquisitions (more than 20% of their market capitalization) tend to overprice their targets and end up with 
companies that don’t perform as expected. If we observe these deals by the type of company that 
undertakes them in terms of their BTM ratio, as seen on Table 9, we can see how 26% of the M&A deals 
undertaken by “value” firms have ended up being expensive while only 16% of “glamour” firms’ deals 
can be considered so. This seems to confirm the conclusions of the previous section in which we 
considered “value” firms to be much more prone to overpricing their M&As and end up with non-positive 
returns from them. 
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Table 9. Matrix of total amount of M&As defined by the BTM of the bidder and the Relative Cost 
of the transaction. 
BTM and Rel. Cost 
 Cheap Expensive Grand Total 
Glamour 74 14 88 
Value 67 23 90 
Grand Total 141 37 178 
 
Section 6. Culture Difference (H5) 
As mentioned before I wanted to study the effects of the power difference index (PDI), the 
individualism vs collectivism index (IDV) and the uncertainty avoidance index (UAI) on the performance 
of cross border M&As in Japan.  
Table 10. CAR of bidders’ cross-section descriptive analysis across Horizontal (low PDI) and 
Vertical (high PDI) target companies. 
Abnormal Returns by PDI 
 Horizontal Vertical 
Mean 0.11428092** 0.01811519 
Standard Error 0.04427529 0.05485324 
t-stat 2.5811443 0.33024835 
Median 0.06919578** 0.04094782 
Count 106 77 
Minimum CAR -1.4591699 -1.4864194 
Maximum CAR 1.630014 1.26119413 
** Statistical significance at 5% confidence level 
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Table 11. CAR of bidders’ cross-section descriptive analysis across Collectivist (low IDV) and 
Individualistic (high IDV) target companies 
Abnormal Returns by IDV 
 Collectivist Individualistic 
Mean 0.03862698 0.0946262** 
Standard Error 0.05943748 0.04243636 
t-stat 0.64987579 2.22983783 
Median 0.09866928 0.06184396** 
Count 68 115 
Minimum CAR -1.4864194 -1.4591699 
Maximum CAR 1.26119413 1.630014 
* Statistical significance at 5% confidence level 
 
Table 12. CAR of bidders’ cross-section descriptive analysis across Low, Middle and High UAI 
target companies.  
Abnormal Returns by UAI 
 Low UAI Middle UAI High UAI 
Mean 0.06675045 0.07250714 0.08828413 
Standard Error 0.06221959 0.04837542 0.08321929 
t-stat 1.07282038 1.49884258 1.06086135 
Median 0.04094782 0.05356** 0.12984099 
Count 57 90 36 
Minimum CAR -1.2563497 -1.4864194 -0.900201 
Maximum CAR 1.630014 1.25224322 1.19483931 
** Statistical significance at 5% confidence level 
 
The results point to only two sets of statistically significant CAR: when Japanese companies 
acquire horizontal companies (11.4%), that is to say, companies with a PDI lower than that of Japan, and 
individualistic companies (9.5%), which are the ones with a IDV higher than the Japanese one. These 
results point out to the fact that Japanese companies achieve better results if they pursue companies that 
operate in cultures more different than their own. The results are further strengthened by the Wilcoxon 
signed ranks test performed on the medians, which are in line with the mean analysis. This surprising 
results contradict our initial assumption stated in H5. They also indicate that, following the 2000-2009 
period that Bremer et al. (2017) studied, in which we observed how UAI played a strong part in the 
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decision-making process of Japanese companies looking for international expansions, in the new 2008-
2015 post-crisis period, UAI does not play a crucial part in this process. This suggests that Japanese 
companies are breaking out of their shell and pursuing opportunities in new countries that seemed too 
risky before the global financial crisis.  
A deeper hypothesis that comes from analyzing the results is whether the inside organization of 
the relationship between the Japanese bidder and the target company affects these results. Looking at it 
from a corporate structure point of view, it would be more logic for Japanese companies to have an easier 
time intervening at companies with a similar culture than their own, that is to say collectivist and vertical, 
rather than in horizontal and individualistic firms. Following this reasoning, Japanese companies could 
choose to delegate more in the case of horizontal and individualistic firms, which seems to be working for 
them in light of the positive CAR found in this research. This points out to the value of delegation in the 
case of horizontal and individual firms, while overt interventionism on the side of the Japanese bidder 
seems to have a negative effect on the performance of collectivist and vertical firms. This is just 
speculation and a further study of these organizational decisions falls outside of the scope of this paper, 
but nonetheless the results do seem to suggest that Japanese acquirers follow different strategies depending 
on the target companies and that the strategies they apply to companies that are more different than them 
are working better.  
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Section 7. Final Regression 
Table 13. Regression of long-term CAR of Japanese bidders in M&A on multiple variables.  
  Expected Coefficient t Stat 
Intercept Zero -0.220335496 -1.04446366 
Cash/Revenue Zero -0.018684176 -0.597360238 
BTM Negative -0.010260378 -0.462403918 
Relative Cost Positive 0.029598389 0.182306003 
PDI Dummy A Positive 0.334079425 1.685023348* 
IDV Dummy B Negative 0.226832969 1.14584108 
UAI Dummy 1 C Zero 0.067263474 0.719939593 
UAI Dummy 2 D Zero 0.130802774 1.17824626 
A Set to 1 for Horizontal companies and 0 for Vertical 
B Set to 1 for Collectivist companies and 0 for Individualistic 
C Set to 1 for Low UAI and 0 for others 
D Set to 1 for High UAI and 0 for others 
*Statistical significance at 10% level of confidence 
 
Putting all the variables together, we can observe how the only coefficient that is significant, at 
least at a 10% critical level, is the PDI Dummy variable that points to a positive relationship between long 
term CAR for Japanese bidders and target companies following a more horizontal power distribution. 
Almost all the other variables apart from the IDV Dummy follow the expected relationship observed 
previously but are deemed to statistically insignificant to incur a more serious analysis.   
Chapter 7. Final conclusions 
The study of cross border acquisitions of Japanese companies in the 2008-2015 period has led to 
some interesting conclusions. The CAR clearly tells us that, after a lukewarm five-day reaction due to the 
mixed public expectations that Japanese international operations have in the present day, the long term 
returns are significantly positive. This result is promising enough by itself, since long term event studies 
have received mixed and inconclusive answers in past periods (Jensen & Ruback, 1983; Kummer & 
Hoffmeister, 1978), showing that the new wave of Japanese M&As starting after the global financial crisis 
has had solid positive returns for now.  
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Looking at the possible reasons behind this positive CAR, we see that companies with low BTM 
(the so-called “glamour” firms) and those who buy relatively cheap targets have significant positive long-
term results. This suggests the apparition of a new wave of more global-minded, high growth Japanese 
companies of the new millennia that understand the new sources of growth in the global economy and are 
not afraid to pursue them.  
The study of the effect of cultural dimensions on these M&A deals also sheds some light on the 
targets and the relationship between them and the bidder. It shows that Japanese companies are not bound 
by uncertainty anymore in the M&A decision-making process and those that choose to pursue targets that 
are more culturally different than them can achieve significant positive results. I also speculate that the 
positive return of these companies is due to the different strategies Japanese firms follow depending on 
the culture behind their target, something that could be developed in further studies with access to inside 
information on the nature of the relationship between bidder and target.  
Speculating on possible future analysis of the data set used in this dissertation, it would be very 
interesting to see this long-term performance under different spotlights. More specifically how they relate 
to different operating indicators like fixed asset investments or yearly operating cash-flow variations that 
followed the purchase. I believe this would shed some light on the different strategies Japanese companies 
implement to these new international businesses they have acquired. Relating to the cultural analysis 
carried out in this thesis, I believe the analysis of human resources management would bring more value 
to the current conclusions. A study on whether staff movements (either from the target company to the 
bidder or vice versa) affected this long-term CAR would be ideal, since I believe this would be a good 
estimator on cultural mixing between acquirer and bidder and it would be possible to test whether an 
increased contact between different cultures inside the company can bring out more profit as this paper 
seems to point out to. Unfortunately it mainly relies on inside information currently unavailable.  
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